Love in a changing climate: the rise of romance in a Greek village, 1977-80

Roger Just
University of Kent

I'm going to start this paper with a half-hearted methodological apology, because what I really want to talk about is an aspect of social (and cultural) change. And when anthropologists talk about social change they are often accused – and often accuse themselves – of contrasting the observable changes of the present with some notion of a static and "traditional" past. That is not surprising, because their informants often talk in just that way: "In the old days we did this; now everything is falling apart." The "system", the integrated social, cultural and moral order that could be grasped and presented as a whole, seems always to belong to some earlier and idealized way of life. The present, by contrast, seems always to be the time when that system is breaking down.

In my case, however, the changes I was observing took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s – a quarter of a century ago now. I think, therefore, that I might be spared the charge of presenting a static account of the past, for that is where my changes are now located. My problem is rather different. I cannot take you up to the present. And I draw attention to this because I suspect that many of my readers who are Greek, and certainly those who represent a younger generation of Greeks, may wonder why I am talking about social change at all, since what I describe as change may now strike you as simply part and parcel of life as it has always been. Twenty-five years is after all quite a long time.

But let me go back to 1976 when I first went out to Greece, and to the tiny island of Meganisi off the coast of Lefkadha, to do my fieldwork. I had dutifully read everything I could find in English on the ethnography of Greece. It wasn't an onerous duty, because there wasn't much written: Ernestine Friedl's account of a village in rural Viotia, *Vasilika* (1962); my supervisor John Campbell's classic study of the Sarakatsani (*Honour, family and patronage*, 1964); his student Juliet du Boulay's *Portrait of a Greek mountain village*, in Evia (1974); Peter Loizos's *The Greek gift: Politics in a Cypriot village* (1975); and then Margaret Kenna's doctoral dissertation on the island of Anafi (then under the pseudonym of Nisi) (1971); Peter Allen's dissertation on a depopulated community in the Mani (1973); and a dozen or so articles published in various anthropological journals, in collected volumes edited by John Peristiany (1965, 1968), and in a volume edited by Muriel Dimen and Ernestine Friedl (1976). Up to 1976, that was about it – although a number of other scholars who also did their fieldwork before 1976, notably Renée Hirschon (1989) and Michael Herzfeld (1985), subsequently published their findings, while many of the above-mentioned anthropologists continued to publish on their pre-1976 fieldwork.

The corpus was not huge, the dates of actual fieldwork spanned over twenty years, and ethnographic locations were scattered all over Greece; nevertheless, when it came to gender roles, to what might be called a division of moral labour between the sexes, and to the question of marriage, there was a remarkable consistency in reportage. As Juliet du Boulay's villagers in Evia were wont to remark: "Τα κορίτσια είναι μπελάς" (girls are trouble) (1983: 245). And they were a trouble on two converging grounds. The first was economic, for young women had to be provided with dowries, which everyone complained about, but which everyone – fathers, brothers, and, when it came to providing the trousseau, mothers – also worked overtime to provide. As du Boulay argues, however, to explain the lamentation of daughters on purely economic grounds does

not bear scrutiny. Setting up a son in life actually cost a great deal more than setting up a daughter, while many women married with small dowries, or even with no dowry at all – as Friedl reported for Vasilika, and as I found to have been the case on Meganisi, where people claimed that they had given "whatever they could". And given that both houses and land were reserved for sons, "whatever they could" had often turned out to be not much at all. As du Boulay argues, it was not until the 1960s, with accelerating migration from the countryside to Athens and to other urban centres, that dowries began to spiral upwards, for urban migration meant that there was a shortage of eligible men in the village. In order to attract one, what often had then to be supplied was an urban residence. But whether dowries were large or small, it should still be pointed out that marriage entailed, and quite explicitly so, economic considerations; for parents, whether of daughters or sons, wished to ensure that their children had the best possible start in the world. And given that women were, as it were, the passive partners in marriage transactions, even if dowries were small, getting one's daughters married in a manner that would assure their future material well-being was a major parental concern. In this respect the situation was not far removed from Jane Austen's *Sense and sensibility* – though, as we shall see, with perhaps a little more sense and little less sensibility.

Nevertheless the economic grounds on which "τα κορίτσια είναι μπελάς" must be complemented by a second set of considerations – considerations that related to beliefs about the essential vulnerability of women, who, as du Boulay explains (1986), were by nature weak, little able to exercise self-control, and whose sexuality, in a society that placed heavy emphasis on female chastity and pre-marital virginity, posed a threat not only to themselves but to the good names of their families. Girls had to be guarded. Such beliefs were, of course, closely connected to many of the teachings of the Orthodox Church, whose fathers, as Eva Topping stridently pointed out in 1983, had consistently maintained woman's innate intellectual

inferiority, described her as "the weaker vessel", and equated her with the temptress, Eve. Sociologically, the consequences of such views about women – which cannot, I think, be attributed solely to the Orthodox Church, for they were, and are, widely distributed throughout non-Orthodox and non-Christian communities – were central to the anthropological discussion of "Honour and Shame" in the 1960s and 1970s. In a highly competitive environment, a family's honour depended substantially on its men-folk's ability to protect, and vouch for, the sexual chastity of its women.

Now: put together the economic considerations attendant on marriage, and the moral considerations related to the perceived nature of women, and it is hardly surprising that marriages in Greece were overwhelmingly, and normatively, arranged: contracted by negotiation, by *proxenia*, and often employing the services of a go-between, a *proxenitis*. It is hardly surprising, too, that what could upset the apple-cart, what could confound everybody's best-laid plans, was "love", αγάπη. As the members of Renée Hirschon's working-class community in Piraeus put it in the 1970s: "Η αγάπη είναι κακό πράγμα: φέρνει καταστροφή" (love is bad thing; it brings catastrophe) (1989: 116). Juliet du Boulay's villagers in Evia were of very much the same opinion: marriages for love would almost certainly be regretted by both parties (1974: 94). And according to Mari Clark, even in the early 1980s, villagers in Methana held a strong belief that while a sound economic base was essential to the success of a marriage, love was not (1988: 340). Please note, by the way, that I am not suggesting (and nor were any of the sources that I have cited) that an idea of romantic love was unknown in rural or working-class Greece, or that romantic love was not celebrated in song and verse (it most certainly was), or even that it was not felt by some unhappy shepherd or cloistered farmer's daughter. Campbell's Sarakatsani had heard the testimony of love songs in the 1950s; but as they remarked (in a manner, come to think of it, not so far removed from Plato), "the songs tell lies" (1964:

124). Love was not unknown or unrecognized; the point, rather, was that something so profoundly important as marriage, on which the future well-being of the next generation depended, and by which the present prestige of all the contracting parties was measured, could not be left to the transient emotional states of two immature individuals.

I was somewhat surprised, then, to find that on Meganisi in the late 1970s everybody *was* marrying "for love", and, according to my informants, always had done so – doubly surprised, since in most other respects (though not, as we shall see, quite all) gender relations were much as they had been described in all the ethnographic accounts I had read. Young women lived quite restricted lives, and though they were not locked up, they were also not much to be seen. Their appropriate place, as Renée Hirschon describes for the Piraeus, was στο σπίτι, "at home". In the evenings a group of them might walk arm-in-arm down the street, but if any young men were encountered, eyes were lowered, and no more than a mumbled "good-evening" would be exchanged. Certainly courtship, or the notion of "going-out" with a boy, was unknown in the village. Admittedly, those girls who had moved with their families to Athens for part of the year so that they, or their brothers, could study at high-school or university, had a somewhat freer relationship with the opposite sex. They would go out for coffee in mixed groups, or attend the Meganisiot Society's Athenian club-rooms, but they were still always under the benign (though watchful) eye of a brother, or, at the club, of some older Meganisiot, and they did not, at least licitly, ever go out with any particular boy. Virginity or, perhaps more importantly, the unimpeachable presumption of virginity, remained the *sine qua non* of any girl's claim to respectability.

As for marriages, one way or another they were still arranged – though what might be meant by "arranged" varied quite considerably. At one end of the scale, two girls of 17 were unceremoniously dispatched to South Africa during my stay to be married off to a couple of young Meganisiot émigrés who

had made a few weeks' visit back to the island to acquire, through the good graces of their friends and relatives, suitable brides. Similarly, a young Meganisiot man, who had spent 12 years in California and who had come back to his ancestral home for a few weeks' holiday, found himself, courtesy of his relatives, suddenly engaged to be married, and was still in a slight state of shock as I sat drinking with him on the eve of his wedding. "Hey, man, I'm not sure that this is going to work out. She doesn't even speak English..." At the other end of the scale, those young men and women who were living or studying most of the year in Athens, and who were joining Greece's new and growing professional bourgeoisie, denied that their marriages were arranged, and certainly they never used the term *proxenia*; but their parents still vetted potential partners, and it was noticeable that the better-to-do and educated were carefully marrying the better-to-do and educated. In the village itself, however, *proxenia* was still explicitly the norm. A young man was attracted to a young woman; he spoke to his father; his father secured the assistance of a trusted friend or relative; the friend or relative spoke with the parents of the young woman; her parents in turn consulted their close relatives – and if all parties were agreeable, the match was made. The part that any young woman played in the affair, other than giving or withholding her consent, was scarcely an active one. As one young man of 28 told me, he had watched his 17-year-old bride playing in the school yard since she was a little girl, and had said to himself, "I'll have this one." It was, he remarked, "like a spider with a fly".

Finally, dowry, too, was generally given – although this is a complicated matter, for there was a village consensus that "these days the boys don't seek dowry", and it was true that in some few cases women were marrying with very small dowries or with none at all (as, I think, had always been the case on Meganisi); in general, however, in the late 1970s Meganisi was experiencing the sort of dowry inflation that was being reported for Greece as a whole. What made it possible for the

Meganisiots to deny the importance of dowry was the claim that the property or money settled on a daughter at the time of her marriage played no part in *determining* the marriage; rather it was *supplementary to it*. What followed was a reclassification of the institution. The apartment in Athens, or the money given towards its acquisition, was not "dowry", προίκα – it was merely βοήθεια, "help".

It could be argued, then, that in practice gender relations on Meganisi, and the concomitant bases for marriage, were pretty much as they had been reported in the ethnographic literature prior to 1977 – with the notable exception that love was *not* considered a catastrophe. Far from it; love was extolled and very much in the air. In fact it didn't matter much who I talked to, they were all getting married "for love", or had all got married "for love", including the girls who were packed off to South Africa (at least, according to their relatives; propriety forbade me to speak to them myself). Even the elderly, those who had been married for forty or fifty years, claimed that in their youth they too had married "for love" – a claim that must have been arrived at somewhat retrospectively, since old men, bemoaning the decline of morals, also let slip the fact that they had scarcely seen the face of their bride, much less talked to her, before their wedding day.

Admittedly, there were a few dissenting voices. One old woman had been sent from Lefkadha to Meganisi as a youthful bride by her father, a merchant, who built her a dowry house there in order to procure a Meganisiot sailor as a son-in-law to transport his goods. The son-in-law died within a couple of years, leaving her stranded, a widow, on a "foreign" island. Sixty years later she still didn't think much of the Meganisiots, and she was still very cross about her marriage. It had been an εμπορικό πράμα, a "commercial matter", she snorted. But in general, romance glossed even tales of the island's historical settlement. Transhumant shepherds, it was said, brought their flocks across to Meganisi for winter pasturage. A shepherd would then "see" a Meganisiot girl (την είδε); he would fall in

love with her (την αγάπησε); and he would marry her and settle down on the island. No mention here of the obvious advantages of permanent grazing rights, and of a house to live in instead of a shepherd's hut.

But if everyone was now marrying "for love", and if even the elderly now claimed that they too had done so in the past, it could, I suppose, still be argued that all that had changed was a form of words; that whatever "love", αγάπη, now meant, it could not mean what it means in, say, Britain or the USA or northern Europe, since the context within which it arose was so different. This was brought home to me when I ran into a Meganisiot friend of mine in Lefkadha. He had been on a shopping trip and showed me the new laminex dining-table he had bought, explaining that now that his family was growing, he needed a larger one. I expressed surprise, since my friend and his wife were both in their late forties, and had only one child, a son, Takis.

"Well, Takis might be getting married soon," explained my friend.

"I didn't know he was engaged," I replied.

"No, he's not," said my friend, "But who knows? He's finished his military service now, so he might fall in love in the next few months."

From my friend's point of view, "love" was a question of ripe time – in much the same way that marriage had always been a question of ripe time in rural Greece. And if it was time for Takis to get married, then it was time for Takis to fall in love.

As for young women, I was not in a position to discuss their feelings with them, but certainly they looked happy enough when their engagements were announced, and my suspicion is that if a girl's father, and mother, and brothers, and any number of other people whom she trusted – including dear old Uncle Giorgos, who had acted as go-between – told her that the good-looking young man whom she had seen and admired in church, who had excellent prospects, and who came from a fine

family, was madly in love with her, then, *mirabile dictu*, "love" might easily label the emotional grounds on which she accepted the match. In the end, however, I think it is wrong-headed to dispute the authenticity of the Meganisiots' assertions of "love" by querying either its genesis or the social context in which it arose. After all, it is not as if the rest of the western world (that has for so long sworn by it) is particularly good at defining it. It's also not as if the rest of the west does not also "fall in love" in accordance with ripe time and any number of other socially specifiable considerations: wealth, class, reputation, education, ethnicity, or simply availability and proximity. Any sociologist will tell you that. So nowadays will any marriage bureau. Equally, I think it would be a mistake to claim that all that had changed on Meganisi in the 1970s was a form of words just because everything else connected with gender and marriage had stayed much the same. The point is surely that while we can "objectively" be shown to marry in accordance with wealth, class, education, proximity etc., no suitor (as opposed to sociologist) may dare state that truth, nor even, importantly, think it, for the role that social and economic factors play in the formation of marriage has for long been ideologically displaced, and effectively banished, from discourse by a sincere belief in the absolute moral primacy of a psychological and affective state whose determining role cannot, in all decency, be challenged.

That, I think, is what was happening on Meganisi, too, in the 1970s – and that, I think, is not just a matter of words. The Meganisiots' adoption of "love" as the basis for marriage signals a quite radical reconstruction of events, even if, "objectively", the course of those events themselves remained much the same. We enter, as Foucault would put it, a new discursive formation – a certain dispersal of regularities, a certain connection between concepts, statements, choices (1972: 38). The re-evaluation of love was why dowry, whose size had in most cases increased, had nevertheless to be transmogrified into "help"; why it had to be seen as *attendant on* marriage and not

formative of marriage, why boys could not "seek dowry" even though they usually got it and were happy to accept it. And the same applied to such other erstwhile criteria for marriage as coming from an honourable family, or having good prospects, or even coming from the same village (for village-endogamy was much preferred). What had before constituted the grounds for marriage were now seen as the happy, but, as it were, coincidental attributes of the individual with whom one had fallen in love – on which grounds, and which grounds only, one married. The real question, then, is not "what is love?" or "what was love for the Meganisiots?" (let that remain a black box), but rather, why had a discourse of love triumphed in the late 1970s over franker recognitions of material and social considerations?

There is, of course, an easy answer – a version of good old-fashioned diffusionism. Many Meganisiots had, after all, travelled the world, either as sometime migrants, or, in the case of men, as sailors in the Greek merchant marine. They were quite familiar with non-Greek society and its preoccupations. Still more had lived, or continued to live, on a part-time basis in Athens – and the Greek urban bourgeoisie, long integrated with the rest of the West, was certainly producing its own homilies to love, which, by the 1970s, were transmitted to every village. Meganisi got electricity in 1973; by 1976 every coffee-shop had a television set that relayed Greek soap opera of an outrageously romantic sort. Magazines such as *Ρομάντζο* (Romance) were available and read in the village, and as a matter of fact Mills and Boon was doing a brisk business in Greek translation. One could simply argue that rural Greece was being besieged by love – and one could also argue that there was plenty of top-down pressure within Greek society for its rural population to conform to generically western ideological modes. Socialist prime minister Andreas Papandreou's famous abolition of dowry did not take place until 1982, just after my fieldwork, but his move was symptomatic of the times, and equally symptomatic of Greece's foreign-educated leadership.

Papandreou did not, of course, abolish dowry; he merely abolished a specific form of legal conveyance. But he did speak a new language for rural Greece:

> "[Dowry]", he proclaimed, "was an anachronistic institution that humiliated women and adulterated the essence of marriage by turning it from a free choice of a profoundly human relationship into a coarse financial transaction symbolizing the woman's submission to the dominant male." (Modiano 1982)

"The essence of marriage"?; "a profoundly human relationship"?; "free choice"? Sociologically the terms may be less than pellucid; rhetorically and ideologically, however, they form a quite recognizable set: our set, indeed. Conversely, the description of dowry as "anachronistic" probably touched a few raw nerves – for there was a fear felt by many Greeks in the 1970s, and quite particularly by rural Greeks, that despite a 2,500 year head-start their society was, in comparison with the rest of Europe, culturally "backward".

And yet while I have no doubt that Meganisi (and rural Greece as a whole) was influenced by the media and by outside voices, whether Greek and foreign, I do not think this is a sufficient explanation for their adoption of love as the only acceptable motivation for marriage. Pretty much everywhere in the world these days is subject to such influences, but they have not everywhere been embraced. Why did not the Meganisiots say, much as John Campbell's Sarakatsani had said twenty-five years earlier, "The poets – and Mills and Boon, and the television, and even Andreas Papandreou – lie"? Besides which, having invoked Foucault, I can hardly retreat to saying that all the Meganisiots were doing was parroting what they had heard, and I'm too much of an old-fashioned materialist not to want to look for other conditions, other changes, that allowed the adoption of love to form part of a new and self-evident common sense.

One line of thought – and I mention it largely because it was a line of thought often articulated by the villagers them-

selves – was that with economic progress came, automatically, social and cultural advancement. For them, prosperity and "modernity" were inextricably linked (and love was decidedly western and "modern"). It is true that from the 1960s onwards the Meganisiots had become wealthier than they had ever been before, for those who were young enough and fit enough had taken full advantage of the quite lucrative employment then being offered in the Greek merchant shipping industry. By the time of my stay, there was scarcely an able-bodied man who was not, or who had not been at some stage, a sailor. Second, and in common with much of rural Greece, Meganisi had reaped the benefits of overseas emigration to the USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa. Remittances flowed in to village relatives; but further, many Meganisiot emigrants returned to Greece after ten or fifteen years overseas bringing their fortunes with them. Finally, a new generation of professionals and technicians was beginning to emerge: young doctors, lawyers, engineers and mechanics educated on the proceeds of their fathers' years at sea or their parents' foreign savings. But while the linking of economic prosperity with forms of social and cultural liberalism – whether the creation of "profoundly human relationships" (or, for that matter, democracy) – still seems to be something of an article of faith amongst many of those professionally engaged with "Development", I'm afraid I remain a skeptic. There seem to be just too many counter-instances; besides which, I see no reason why western social and cultural forms should constitute the inevitable telos of "modernity".

What the elevation of love as the basis for marriage really signalled was, I think, a shift towards a quite *particular* form of modernity (if one still wishes to retain that word): towards an ideology of individualism, as opposed to collectivism, in terms of which individual choice, individual freedom, individual happiness, individual fulfilment *as defined by the individual*, are granted absolute priority over any external or collective assessments of where an individual's best interests might lie.

The decisive elevation of some uniquely experienced affective state – call it love – exemplifies that ideology, while any suggestion that family, friends, money, property, land, or reputation should play a part in the choice of a marital partner is seen to render that choice unauthentic (and therefore immoral) simply by displacing it from the realm of individual desire. And what makes such an ideology possible, or at least what supplies the conditions for its adoption, is not actually a question of wealth or prosperity – though it remains, I would claim, a question of economic conditions. And here, I confess, I am about to travel a well-worn path: a path first marked out by Engels, but followed by any number of European social historians (Macfarlane 1987: 123-43). What makes such an ideology possible is a change in the *relations of production* – specifically, the demise of a peasant agricultural economy, and a shift towards wage-labour or individual entrepreneurship.

Put simply, in a peasant agricultural society the family was a corporate unit of production and consumption, dependent for its well-being, indeed for its very survival, not exactly on the collective ownership of property (for that was usually vested in the male head of the household), but at least on the collective exploitation of the family's property. Moreover, each generation was dependent on the preceding generation for the transmission of that property – house and land – which alone would allow them to take their place in society. People were not only morally and affectively tied to each other as family; they were also economically bound to each other through their dependence on a common resource.

That system had survived on Meganisi up to the time of my fieldwork, but it was also rapidly disintegrating (as it was disintegrating all over rural Greece in the 1970s). And it was disintegrating on Meganisi as a result of the two factors that I have already mentioned: emigration, and the employment of Meganisi's men as sailors. Actually it is not important for my argument that the Meganisiots' particular employment was at sea; nor is it important where the Meganisiots emigrated to.

What is important is that the wages and salaries that the Meganisiots earned at sea, and the capital and skills that they had acquired overseas, were totally transforming the Meganisiot economy, not only in that the Meganisiots were becoming a great deal wealthier, but also in that the nexus between making a living and the ownership of land was completely broken. And with the break between land and employment came also, of course, a shattering of the interdependence of family members as co-workers of their common resource. Economically, the Meganisiots were becoming atomized. Sons were no longer dependent on fathers for their inheritance. Brothers no longer worked their land together. Success was now individual success, dependent on individual skills, individual commitments, and individual entrepreneurship – and so, I might add, was failure (for what was also emerging by the end of 1970s was an entirely new form of social stratification). But either way, wage labour and entrepreneurship liberated the individual from the family as a unit of production.

This had some immediate consequences for the criteria on which brides were selected (as I mentioned, not everything about gender roles stayed exactly the same). A young woman's reputation, her sexual chastity, was still a primary consideration – hence the continued oversight of daughters and sisters. But any notion that a prospective bride had also to be a hale, hearty and experienced agricultural worker had completely fallen by the way. So, I might add (and for quite some time), had any notion that a prospective bride had to be capable of bearing a large family. To put matters bluntly, in a wage-labour economy, as Susan Buck Sutton (1986) also noted for rural migrants to Athens, women's work had become redundant, and the female role was rapidly being transformed from the productive to the frankly decorative. One of the notable side effects of this was a quite remarkable drop in the age of marriage for women from an average of nearly 26 years up to 1974 (with one in five women being over the age of 30 at the time of their marriage) to an average of only 20 years during the

period of my fieldwork (with nearly 20% of the brides being 18 years old or less). The boys, as they put it, might no longer be openly seeking dowry, but they were openly seeking something just, alas, as unfairly distributed: youth and beauty. As one of my older friends remarked, once upon a time if a woman was a little bit old or a little bit ugly, you could always give her a large dowry; now it didn't matter how much you gave, she was στο ράφι, "on the shelf".

But more important than the criteria by which brides were chosen was the issue of who chose them. And it seemed that overwhelmingly it was now the young men themselves. The process of *proxenia*, of arrangement, had still to be gone through, for in the absence of any tolerated means of direct courtship within the village, they still had to approach their prospective bride through the intermediary of friends and family. But the choice was theirs alone. Old men and women grumbled that these days they were marrying mere babies who couldn't even boil an egg, but any resistance to a match by a young man's parents could be dismissed on the grounds that, frankly, it was none of their business. And it was none of their business because wage labour made men independent at an early age from the economic authority of their elders. Moreover, that same economic independence allowed them to build a new house for themselves and their bride prior to, or on, marriage, rather than having to go through a period of married cohabitation with their parents until their father died and they inherited. Neolocal residence was becoming the norm, and young women, once subject to the authority (and, I suspect, choice) of their mother-in-law, were no longer the family's bride (η νύφη μας – "our bride"), but solely their husband's wife. As for dowry, or "help", as I have suggested, in most cases it was increasing rather than decreasing, but in a non-agricultural economy it no longer contributed to the basic requirements of existence. Moreover, given the shortage of eligible men in the village (since as non-agricultural workers they were no longer tied to the village), men could exercise their free choice in

selecting a bride and still expect to receive financial assistance from their parents-in-law without having to demand it. Precisely as the Meganisiots argued, dowry had become supplementary to a match, not a determinant of it.

So the choice of a marriage partner is now left to the unencumbered desire of a young man, and the at least willing acceptance of a young woman. So much was self-evident to all, grumbling elders included. And that desire already had a renowned label: love – whose occurrence was not, of course, a catastrophe, because now it was about the only way left of getting your daughter married. But let me end with a reflection that somewhat exceeds my scholarly competence. The Meganisiots were, through their work at sea, and as a result of emigration, getting richer. But, in conformity with the views of many social historians, I have suggested that it was not wealth *per se*, but the change in the relations of production and the mode of production from peasant agriculture to wage labour that allowed a discourse of love to flourish. In England, where a peasant class ceased to exist long ago (or, according to some scholars, never properly existed at all), the very early and popular celebration of marital love (pushed back, in some radical interpretations, as far as the thirteenth century) can be explained in much the same way: not because most people had become rich – quite the opposite; because, as landless labourers, and later factory workers, as an essentially property-less and, in the Marxist sense, "alienated" work-force, they too possessed no other grounds on which to base a marriage (Macfarlane 1986: 119-208). It was only the propertied classes, the gentry and the aristocracy, who had to be more cautious. All of which makes me wonder whether when, back in 1968, my generation were so loudly singing "All you need is love", it might have been pointed out from a more beady-eyed perspective that in fact love was all that most of us had.

References

Allen, Peter S. (1973). "Social and economic change in a depopulated community in Southern Greece". PhD thesis, Brown University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms

Campbell, John K. (1964). *Honour, family and patronage: A study of institutions and moral values in a Greek mountain community.* Oxford: Clarendon Press

Clark, Mari H. (1988). "The transformation of households on Methana, Greece, 1931-1987". PhD thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms

Dimen, M. and Friedl, E. (eds.) (1976). *Regional variation in Modern Greece and Cyprus: Toward a perspective on the ethnography of Greece.* New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

du Boulay, Juliet (1974). *Portrait of a Greek mountain village.* Oxford: Clarendon Press

du Boulay, Juliet (1983). "The meaning of dowry: changing values in rural Greece", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 1, 243-70

du Boulay, Juliet (1986). "Women – images of their nature and destiny in rural Greece", in: J. Dubisch (ed.), *Gender and power in rural Greece.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 139-68

Foucault, Michel (1972). *The archaeology of knowledge.* London: Tavistock Publications

Friedl, Ernestine (1962). *Vasilika: A village in Modern Greece.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston

Herzfeld, Michael (1985). *The poetics of manhood: Contest and identity in a Cretan mountain village.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Hirschon, Renée (1989). *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The social life of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus.* Oxford: Clarendon Press

Kenna, Margaret (1971). "Property and ritual relationships on a Greek island". PhD thesis, University of Kent

Loizos, Peter (1975). *The Greek gift: Politics in a Cypriot village.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Macfarlane, A. (1986). *Marriage and love in England. Modes of reproduction 1300-1840.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Macfarlane, A. (1987). *The culture of capitalism.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Modiano, Mario (1982). "Greece abolishes male supremacy", *The Times* (1 December) 8

Peristiany, John G. (ed.) (1965). *Honour and shame: The values of Mediterranean society.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson

Peristiany, John G. (ed.) (1968). *Contributions to Mediterranean sociology: Mediterranean rural communities and social change.* Athens: Social Science Centre. First published in cyclostyle form, 1963, as *Mediterranean Sociological Conference. Mediterranean rural communities and social change*

Sutton, Susan Buck (1986). "Family and work: new patterns for village women in Athens", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 4, 33-49

Topping, Eva C. (1983). "Patriarchal prejudice and pride in Greek Christianity. Some notes on origins", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 1, 7-17